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# Multi Patronage and Melting-Pot Social Cleavage: Secularist Political Parties Defeat Islamist Political Parties in Muslim Society

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## Abstrak

A partisan affiliation built from social basic and social cleavage in a relationship of political parties and civil society as mostly discussed, found its new trend to be endshown by local political practices. This study examined why secularist political parties defeat Islamic political parties in muslim society. This study applicate phenomenology to investigate patronage and clientelism relationship between political parties and societies in research area of Probolinggo, East Java. This study had explored four findings, *firstly*, weakening of support from traditional Muslim societies with *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU) affiliated, called *nahdhiyyin*, to Islamic parties and the tendency to support secularist parties particularly to PDIP. *Secondly*, multi patronage phenomena and diversed clientelism which weakens *nahdliyin* support to Islamic party and crossing over of political support to secularist parties. *Thirdly*, personal politics from local strong man effect shaped multi patronage and divergent clientelism as well as ends partisan affiliation. *Fourthly*, social basic had no longer a linear relationship to political parties hence social cleavage faded into new shape, is a melting-pot social cleavage. These findings point out weakening of social basic of Islamic political parties, as irrelevantly political party relationship with social basic to support electoral capacity.

**Keywords:** Multi Patronage; Melting-Pot Social Cleavage; Secularist Political Parties; Islamic Political Parties; Political Phenomenology.

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## INTRODUCTION

Most discussion about function and relationship between political parties and civil society in new modern democratic societies is on the linkage of political parties and societies. The discussions based on the idea of the function of political parties as Katz and Mair stated that political parties have three faces of party politics organizations, party on the ground, party in central office, and party in public office (Ribeiro & Locatelli, 2019). Linkage between political parties and societies in Indonesia swooped on ideas on direct or indirectly political parties dig political supports from societies shaping their relations to societies, on their relations individuals, organizations, social institutions, social groups, institutionalized social ideological and gatherings and other forms of traditional networks that further bring out concepts of patronage, social basic and social cleavage (Disraeli, 2018). This model of relations explains how political parties have contact to potential political resources which derives from social basic, individuals, and local strong men. Patronage between political parties and societies occurs follow social basic conditions and social cleavage. This article describes relations between political parties and societies that focused on patronage practices. It describes linkage between political parties and communities that obscure the partition social cleavage and partisan affiliation that marked social basic for political support to political parties. My thesis is that multi patronage has contributed to the changing pattern of political support people have for political parties, the fading of social cleavage partition and weakening of partisan affiliation. Model of patronage in this research is different from patronage in political literatures which in general found that patronage between political party and social basic has a linear pattern which in turn produce political support or affiliation aligned with its social identity (Gyene, 2019). Social cleavage occurs specifically and has a firm boundary that leads to partisan affiliation with political parties that have close social identity (Randall, 2006).

The term cleavage is usually being used to describe the durable patterns of political behavior that linked social groups and political organizations, such as political parties (Lillemets, 2015). Collective identities are been seen as, to some degree, socially constructed, the attention of actors who help in creating such identifications should naturally be drawn by the collective identity element that cleavages comprehended (Prentoulis & Kyriakidou, 2019).

In Indonesia context, Ufen wrote from Flora and Rokkan, cleavages arise from fundamental social conflicts. They structure the discourse regarding major political questions and, as a consequence, shape the patterns of the party system (Lillemets, 2015). Political actors, and most notably political parties, institutionalize cleavages. The cleavage structure results from the complex relations of cross-cutting and reinforcing cleavages and largely defines the setup of a party system—that is, political platforms, the behavior of individual parties, and the potential for forming coalitions (Ari Ganjar Herdiansah, Junaidi, 2017). In comparison with 1999 today's cleavages are weaker and more difficult to measure. However, the parties' strong bonds with certain social groups and mass organizations such as *Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)* and *Muhammadiyah* show that the parties and party system are still stable as a whole (Al-hamdi, 2019).

What if there is a blur of social cleavage limit on social relations between society with political parties that enable the crossing of ideological and social boundaries? This article elaborates the question by showing social practices in traditional Muslim societies within Probolinggo district, East Java, Indonesia. Relationship between social basic and political parties in this area of research shows cross borderage linkage between society with its political and social patrons being built on the basis of ideological and social identity. Different from the social practices in other parts of Indonesia where the social base of NU-affiliated traditional Islamic societies tends to choose "green party" ("*partai hijau*") or Islamic parties. Multi patronage appears in the structure of this society is due to influence of personal actor, a local strong man which has a social identity that represents identity of the crossing social cleavage. Thus, the idea of social cleavage which originated from social basic that was limited by social partition to affiliate with similar parties become invalid in this area. In this area, the social base of "green society" which is NU-affiliated which is generally affiliated to "green party" or Islamic parties, becomes free by choosing to affiliate themselves with secularist parties. The social basis does not correspond linearly with the party on an official ideological line. There occurs an orientation cross-border that crossed the ideology of social base in determining political preference for political parties. Social cleavage

becomes not applicable and changed to melting-pot cleavage. There is a practice of patronage in traditional Muslim society that leads to figures that have attributes and social identity that able to cross party boundaries. This patronage allows NU residents to prefer PDIP, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (Indonesia Democratic Party – Struggle, secularist party) rather than PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, National Awakening Party) or PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*, Unity Development Party) the Islamic Parties.

## RESEARCH AND METHODS

This research use phenomenology method to understand the philosophical implications of particular life events or phenomena that affect persons or groups. This method was developed by Edmund Husserl in the early 20th century to seriously study subjective experience. Husserl called it *lebenswelt* (life-world) and used the reductionist method to understand consciousness' "intentionality" and "intersubjectivity" (Kuswandro, 2023). The subject's life experience must be seen to manifest the experience (Carman, 2017). Husserlian phenomenology suspends or 'places in brackets' all knowledge constructions inherent in the researcher's way of thinking to allow the subject (phenomenon) to give itself as it is without prejudice or preconceptions that contaminate its 'original form'. Because the researcher sees anything as something itself rather than the product of our knowledge of it from that presuppositionless point. Husserl called this method, *epoche* (Gredel, 2017). Phenomenology aims to awaken researchers by shifting their attention away from the artificial everyday environment and toward the transcendental reality of life (Peña-Guzmán, 2020). Phenomenological study involves in-depth interviews with informants with relevant life experiences.

To implement phenomenological research, the first step is to thoroughly describe the phenomenon or experience to be analyzed, including all related experiences. The second, phenomenon reduction involves reviewing every detail and deleting irrelevant parts. The third phase involves combining applicable explanations and assessing the subject's experience to determine the phenomenon's nature. Fourth, analyzing informants' patterns and themes to identify event structure. Fifth, finish the general explanation, which combines the preceding stage's findings to explain the event. Many fields can benefit from phenomenological research (Kuswandro, 2023).

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Relationship Between Political Parties and Society

The phenomenon is the relationship between political parties and civil society in Indonesia during the transitional period of democracy shows a unique demeneaur. The growth and symptoms of civil society empowerment after the collapse of the New Order regime coincided with the weakening of political parties in the constituency relation shown by the increasing the gap of political party with civil society and autonomous attitude of the voters. This is a destructive relation that does not benefit the consolidation of democracy that requires the existence of an institutional political party and the presence of political parties in public spaces with the community. The constituency is also symbolized by this style of relation, where political parties with constituents and constituents are alienated with political parties and they grow into independent voters. Communities can freely determine the choice of political parties without feeling attached to any ideological bond or social identity. The problem emerges in this condition is the political parties' struggle with civil society, which disrupts the relationship of political parties and civil society in the consolidation of democratic corridors.

The stability and depth of the relationship between political parties and the community is still a matter of political parties. Electoral volatility that demands the maintenance of a social base of voters (niches) that facilitate parties to compete, in the relationship of political parties and society can not be fully done by political parties (Ezrow, 2011). From elections to elections including elections to regional heads, political parties still show weakness of the maintenance of their support bases. Ramlan Surbakti also notes the weaknesses of political parties in Indonesia, which, among other things, he calls it the inability to maintain public knowledge of political parties in accordance with the description of party figures and actions proposed by administrators and political party activists (Lutfi, 2018).

The relation of these political parties and societies also arose in the discussions of Webb, Mainwaring, Randall and Huntington. Webb emphasizes the political party's ability to deal with elections, organizational development and party performance, all of which are acquired by political parties through popular legitimacy, party power, systemic functionality and public knowledge (Schmidt, 2020). This idea is in line with the new institutionalism theory described by Goodin and Klingemann which states that the new institutionalism as "the next revolution" in political science (Santo et al., 2018). It is no longer limited to the meaning of political organization, but more than that, it refers to a stable and permanent behavior, or 'a stable, securing pattern of behavior'. New institutionalism focuses on values and power relationships on the interactions between institutions and individuals, no longer refer to the impact of institutions on individuals (Lowndes, 2002). The relationship of political parties and society, which Vicky Randall describes as party relations with social bases and structures, is mentioned by Randall that parties in developing countries are routinely known to be under-institutionalized referring to the concept of party roots in society such as in Mainwaring concept. Randall also questioned much analysis about the relationship between parties and social structures in the Western world that stem from the Lipset - Rokkan model which he said was not designed to explain the parties in the developing world but reflects the special history of Western Europe (Randall in Brox et al., 2009).

The inability of political parties to maintain a sustainable base of support, according to (Heywood, 2014), shows the symptom of deterioration and decline in capability as a representative agent and the mobilization of voter support. On the other hand, the pattern of community support for political parties also follows the characteristics of the locality of the arena, so that support models such as those proposed by Randall citing Lipset and Rokkan for the model of political party and community relations can be traced to elicit the characteristics and models of the development of political parties which is typical of Indonesia. In this case it means to add an explanation of the Lipset model - Rokkan that reflects the Western European context and does not explain the emergence of parties in the developing world (Heywood, 2014). The relationship of political parties and society which in Scott Mainwaring's concept is the rooting or abnormality of political parties in society, intersects with the ability of political parties to maintain power over society through the utilization of their habitus and capital in relation to society. The rooting or anchoring of political parties in the community is in line with the concept of electoral volatility namely the stability of elections against the political parties concerned in every election. The electoral volatility of political parties holds the meaning of continuity of symbolic power in the arena.

In local political arena, namely the legislative elections and the election of regional heads, the symbolic power of political parties shows the symptoms of political anomalies. Political parties in legislative elections that gain significant votes and win the majority of seats in local parliament (*The DPRD*) can not necessarily win their candidates in local elections. There are symptoms of political anomalies in the relation of political parties with the community in the local political arena of legislative and local elections. In this relation, political parties conduct electoral activities to win elections in the local political arena, namely legislative elections held at the local (regional) and local elections. In this relationship, the political party's inability to maintain and maintain its support base permanently or long term. In legislative elections, political parties that get significant votes and seats in local representative institutions (*The DPRD*) do not necessarily win their candidates in local elections, in the same arena. This fact shows that the subject of political parties is increasingly distant and far removed from its social base, as William Crotty stated, political parties lose control over the choice of candidates who are advancing under their labels. Or, what he said as a decline of political parties is a distant relationship between the party and their supporters (Scarrow, 2009). The condition of this political party is in accordance with what Walter Dean Burnham, also cited by Crotty as "party decomposition" and "long-term disaggregation" (Parties, 2012). The Crotty and Burnham study focuses on separating voters from political parties, namely increasing the independence of voters in determining candidates, leading to a decrease in the affiliative impact of the party on electoral decisions (Mack, 2010).

Strong links or links with social groups such as churches, trade unions, or other non-governmental organizations are good indicators for measuring party fires in the community (Basedau & Stroh, 2011). Relations of political parties and society, which in the local political arena



raises the question of volatile electoral volatility for political parties and the inability of maintaining a supportive social base combined with the character of voting society which William Crotty (Katz & Crotty, 2006) says as independent voters requires comprehensive explanation that can structurize the electoral support of political parties as referred by Vicky Randall, the model of political party and community relations and the pattern of voter support as formulated by Lipset – Rokkan (Bértoa, 2014), to explain the phenomena in developing countries because the Lipset-Rokkan model is a reflection of the structure of Western Europe; then explains the decline and decline in the ability of political parties as agents of representation and the mobilization of voter support in the conception of Andrew Heywood, which in itself explains the party's firearms in society as referred to Mainwaring and the transformation of political parties and the transformation of the political base of supporters of political parties (Samnuzulsari et al., 2019). Political parties contribute to the stability and effectiveness of democracy, in addition to connect the society and government. The main function demands a political party capable of connecting with elections and has what it calls "popular legitimacy" that focuses on healthy networks between political parties and society. Popular legitimacy focuses on the health of the relationship between political parties and society, as measured by the stability of relationship between political parties and society and how much the party is acknowledged by society (Mair et al., 2020). The party's deep-rooted power in society leads to a more stable interaction of the party system. Also, the strengthening of society's acknowledgement in a party, the more stable the party will be, as well as the democratic political system. Party stability is emphasized by (Huntington, 2004) who views political parties as having a vital role in the political system to realize the creation of a "political order". Political parties are said to be institutionalized, Webb continued, citing Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal, the social basic considers the party as an essential and necessary component of the desired democratic political system (Bonilla et al., 2011).

Mainwaring and Torcall assume that party roots in society, referring to Mainwaring's study with Timothy Scully, since the democratization of the third wave in Huntington's view, experienced institutional weakness and then became prevalent in a competitive political regime. He said that the weakness of the party in the maintenance of a supportive social base which, among others, arises in the form of instability and discontinuity of voter preferences to the party, signifying the lack of party roles in society. The weakness of the party in the maintenance of its social base is explained by Karp stating that the party that feels it already has good capital adequacy in the community at first, makes the party will not be moved to do the necessary political mobilization because it feels that it already have a solid base and feel do not need or do not try too much to develop political mobilization, which ultimately impact on the lack of maintaining party support base. The intermittent chain reaction between the originally strong social base, which makes the party reluctant to mobilize its elections, ultimately impacting the party's electoral ability and its roots in society, is one of the topics of institutionalization of current political parties requiring further study.

Maintenance of the social base through ideological similarity becomes the main point and occupies the top ranking in the priority scale of party's political mobilization activity. However, in fact the party tends to carry the agenda across their own ideology and does not specify specific ideological and programmatic specifications, so it is more likely to pattern ideology, as in the case of the NU mass base with PDI-P in the city of Probolinggo district which would be discussed later. In this case the party has lost its ideological identity. The linkage between the ideological identity of the party and the maintenance of social base in the community at the local level has not yet gained attention in research on institutionalization of the party on the aspect of party ideology identity and party long-term roots in the community.

The long-term uninterrupted subject of voters to political parties, but moving freely and outside the control space of political parties, indicates the weakening of institutionalization of political parties in social practice in the local political arena. Political parties are incapable of maintaining the ideological identity of their party in social practice in the political arena which should be a reference of party's political electoral mobilization in society for better party roots, and is a benchmark for institutional political parties. This fact shows that the subject of political parties is increasingly distant from their electorate base, as William Crotty says, political parties lose control over the choice of candidates who come forward under their labels. Or, what he said

as a decline of political parties is a distant relationship between the party and their supporters. The condition of this political party is in accordance with what Walter Dean Burnham which Crotty also quoted as "party decomposition" and "long-term disaggregation". The Crotty and Burnham Study (2014) focuses on the separation of voters from political parties, namely increasing the independence of voters in determining candidates, resulting in a decrease in the affiliative impact of the party on electoral decisions (Crotty, 2014).

The model of political relationships with local people is more characterized by patronage relations and clientelism involving local elites and local people. Political parties also take advantage of these traditional informal connectivity lines that have patronage and clientelism provided to approach local people to maintain their electoral capacities. The constructed relationships are more likely to be personalistic than institutional political parties, and are driven by pragmatic desires from the pursuit of pragmatic targets of party elites. This model of relation, which involves the electoral activity of political parties, was discovered by Edward Aspinall, as found in a book he co-authored with Mada Sukmajati, entitled "Money Politics in Indonesia: Patronage and Clientelism in Legislative Election 2014", reveals electoral phenomena at grass-roots based patronage and clientelism in the form of vote buying, the provision of goods to certain groups (club goods), the provision of social services and the utilization of public funds for the interests of electors (pork barrels politics). Aspinall also found brokerage practices or informal intermediary networks to reach out to voters (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016)

Aspinall's description is enough to provide an explanation on the model of political party relations and citizens in the context of the 2014 legislative election in Indonesia, but has not yet explained how the relationship works on political parties and society and how these relationships change in different political arenas. The patronage and clientelism model as Aspinall's describe leaves a problem that requires explanation that the political party, through its functional representation and legislative, practices the use of material capital (money and goods) to maintain its electoral capacity. This reality does not change the fact that political parties remain incapable of maintaining a permanent or long-term support base in relation to the community. The issues that arise in relation to the political party relationships and the candidates that are nominated by both legislative and candidate candidates are the difficulty in subjugating voters and fostering relations permanent or long term. The fact that voters tend to shift their voting preferences in the legislative and local elections is proof of volatility in the political parties electoral ability, which is evidently the fact of permanent or long-term permanence. Temporary allegations that develop in practical discourse are explanations of "voter pragmatism" in determining their choice, leading to the pragmatism of parties and candidates, to conduct transactions using economic capital in exchange for votes. From this was born "money politics" in transactional relationships between political parties and society, which determines voter preferences. Or, political parties behave pragmatically as well, in response to the pragmatism of the electorate, so they deliberately distance themselves from the electorate and only come to the prospective voter society in the run up to the election. This reality, which shows the party's apathy in institutionalizing its party through the long-term maintenance of its social base in society, undoubtedly contributes to the institutionalization of political parties and the essence of democracy itself. This reciprocal relationship remained interspersed between the poles of pragmatism behavior, which did not explain why it happened.

### **Patronage in Political Party and Society Relations**

Patronage is a strategy of parties to make societal motivation if the benefits of doing so exceed the costs by using the resources of the state. Depending upon which group it can least afford to alienate (the opponents of the patronage system/the supporters for bureaucratic autonomy or the patronage system's defenders) a party will decide whether it will be driven in one direction or the other (Shefter, 1977). Because the supporters of bureaucratic autonomy have links to so many important institutions in German society, any party that expects to govern the nation finds it necessary to come to terms with this constituency it is prepared to sponsor a social revolution. For example, party such as the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that is allied with the social groups that are advantaged by the traditional recruitment procedures of the German civil service. The

relationship between these groups and the CDU will form its behavior toward civil-service reform and toward patronage in the postwar era

Until 2019 period of general election, there was little incentive to line up behind one locally dominant party. Minor parties became more attractive for rent-seeking networks looking to avoid the costly compromises and investments demanded by larger competitors. As a result, subnational party systems that had previously been held together by the promise of state rewards fractured. The patronage machine was replaced by a partisan melee, in which minor parties running locally popular candidates were able to eat away at the vote share of their large competitors (Allen, 2014). Indonesia's experience under Suharto had long dominated Indonesian politics and sat at the top of a patronage pyramid that extended down into the subprovincial units. The largest party, Golkar, enjoyed a history of privileged access to state resources (Dan et al., 2016). Reform of the formal institutions, combined with changes in informal rules guiding party interaction, led to expectations of local rent sharing in 2004 and 2019. Elites no longer needed to join the local patronage machine to access power. Viable elites in high-rent areas flocked to minor parties that demanded less commitment and contributions from their cadres.

### **The Dynamics of Major Secularist Parties and Islamic Parties**

The individualization of Indonesian party politics combined with the low institutionalization of the party structures has had various consequences, one of which is election campaigns cluster around figures, not political beings. As candidates come and go in every election, so do parties. Thus, voters are floating between parties (Buehler et al., 2009). The lack of a monopoly over Islamic authority has led to a proliferation of Islamic icons, thereby weakening the importance of such figures. If Islam is being used by everyone in their election campaign, then no one is using Islam in their election campaign (Buehler et al., 2009). Both Islamic and Islamist parties (as well as secular parties) depend on clientelist strategies to mobilize the electorate because of the weak cohesion of political parties thus made it difficult to engage in programmatic politics. Consequently, both Islamic and Islamist parties in the regions will likely come and go which could cause the party organizations will remain weak, as power holders have no incentive to develop a competing locus of authority. This in turn caused the votes to show high levels of volatility from election to election, as parties remain disconnected to the electorate. This greatly weakens the party's Islamic message and credibility as the Islamic society had a very high expectation for Islamic parties (Safei, 2015).

### ***Pragmatism of Islamic Party***

Islamic Party is a political organization which consists solely on interest and have to compete in a tight electoral competition, where massive vote support is the key to victory. In order to maintain its existence as a party that can influence or control state power, Islamic parties inevitably have to compromise and are required to be flexible and strategic, thus forcing it to sacrifice one interest for the sake of another. In this context, party ideology is ultimately shelved by the pragmatism of the party's electoral needs (Herdiansah, 2017). The relationship between the failures of political Islam with a growing image of Islam is at the root of the opaque fate of Islamic parties (Buehler, 2018). (Fuller & Kurpershoek, 2004) considered that the polarity of the Islamist group has touched the lives of many lines is included in the political life and it relies too much on icons of primordial Islam and its doctrines-but not accompanied by a behavior that matches with moral teachings and soothing imagery (Sirry, 2007).

When Islam entered the field of practical politics, rather than showing the best side of Islam, on the contrary it only shows the opportunistic and pragmatism side of party politics in general. In Muslims perspective, especially in Indonesia, Islamist parties are no longer believed to really strive for the aspirations of Muslims, hence benefited the secular nationalist-based parties with a few improvements in their political disclosure. This is caused by a gap between the desired hope and aspirations of Muslims to the political parties with the political realities of Islam itself that shows no difference to other 'non-Islamist' political parties. Muslims finally concluded, Islamic parties, as well as many other party politics, are just mere tools for power, nothing more and nothing less (Sholihin, 2013)

## Resemblance of Identity between Secularist Parties and Islamic Parties

The resemblance of identity and public knowledge of the party is shown by similar social activities. Charity patterns are also played by secular parties and Islamic parties. The penetration of Muslim politicians in the secular-nationalist party has been influential. In fact, the 'Islamic factor' seems to have influenced the political discourse of the secular-nationalist party to use 'Islamic expression'. However, the increase of 'Islamic factor' in Indonesia does not correlate with the increase of electoral support for Islamic parties. The 'Islamic factor' does not mean that Islamic parties can easily mobilize Muslim voters. Islamic parties have always been shadowed by secular-nationalist parties in terms of gaining Muslim votes and Islamic aspiration in the parliament never becomes dominant, mainly because of the highly fragmented political orientation of Muslim in Indonesia which showed the failure of Islamic parties (Miichi, 2014). In *Reformation* era, the image of PDI-P as a secular-nationalist party has a bit changed. In recent times, PDI-P has utilized Islamic issues within the party's discourse. PDI-P's gracious attitude toward Islam is partly characterized by the inception of Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (BAMUSI-Home for Indonesian Muslims). BAMUSI was established in 2007 by PDI-P politicians to facilitate "Islamic aspiration" or more importantly, to change the perception of Indonesian Muslims' to PDI-P (Miichi, 2014). Meanwhile, The PKB's seat had decrease from 2004 to 2019. The lack of party ability in maintaining its electoral support base. Although political conditions and regulations may change from time to time, the party as an active player on the local political scene should be able to adapt quickly and maintain its party's existential. The decline in the party's ability to adapt to changes in political conditions in the field, which ultimately leads to a decline in its electoral capacity capacity, indicates a weakening in the institutionalization of the party, especially in the organizational governance of its party and party roots in society (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005).

The PDI-P, despite its secular-nationalist ideology and confronted with the condition of the majority voting community, is able to maintain, even strengthen its electoral capacity since the 2004 elections (26,601 votes with 7 seats in the House), to the general election 2019 with 8 seats in the parliament. The electoral ability of the secular-nationalist PDI-P can be said to have competed with the ability of other Islamic parties, such as PKB with declining voting trends since the 2004 and 2019 elections, and the with the same trend in all three elections, that there is no connection between the ideology and party identity, which ultimately affects the various agenda carried by the party, with the community's electoral support for the party concerned. Is this a failure in the institutionalization of the party in the aspect of party organization identity and the rooting of party politics in society, or whether the identity and ideology of a party is merely a name without any further meaning and function in it which has an electoral advantage.

In general, the parties that continue to exist until the 2019 election could be divided into two party groups: the Islamist Party (PKB, PPP, PKS) and the Nationalist Party (PDI-P, Golkar, Democrat), the trend is the support of the people of Probolinggo District, which has a wide range of traditional Islamic cultures against the two groups of political parties, tends to decline for parties that have been explicitly define / introduced themselves as Islamic parties. As shown in the table, support for PKB, PPP has a trend that tends to decline from the 2004 elections until the 2019 election. Only the PKS, the Islamic party that has increased its electoral support, although the acquisition of seats obtained in the DPRD. As for the Nationalist Party, public support for the party has a trend that tends to increase, it is seen in the acquisition of PDI-P and Golkar votes. However, there are small exceptions for Democrats who have decreased electoral support, although this is suspected to be influenced by public perceptions of the Democrats as a whole and SBY figures as Democratic leaders at the central level who tend to have a negative image. The *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)* residents voted PDI-P because of personality of the leader of the party who had perceived as "the good man" (*oreng sae*). In the public appraisal, regardless of the identity being carried by the party, there is no significant difference between the Nationalist Party and the Islamist Party.

The expectations of society that is too high against the Islamic Party, taking into account the factors of religious doctrine and the idealism of religious teachings in the factor of public assessment of parties that carry the religious ideology as the identity of his party, became one of the main factors causing public disappointment against the Islamic Party when faced with the fact that political parties, regardless of party packaging and branding, remain a political machine with the primary aim of gaining public support through elections for the elite gains of party elites. The



identity of the party, whether it be nationalist, religious, or any other identity, is merely a brand / branding used by the party to approach voter society in order to increase the party's electoral capacity. Thus, people tend to prefer the secularist parties (or popular as 'nationalist party'), because at least they are quite consistent in carrying the ideology and party agenda, and relatively less disappointing than the Islamic Party. Moreover, the doctrine that has prevailed in society that religion and politics should be separated. Thus, religious leaders should not join in practical politics, especially if they join the movement of political party machine, which is common in the 'Islamic party'. This further strengthened the public's disappointment with the Islamic parties and shifted its preferences to the more undesirable secularist parties. Then, when confronted with the harsh reality of the true identity of every political party, that is a mere political machine and, the society becomes apathetic towards any ideology or agenda carried by the party. The community can finally judge the party objectively as an intermediary for certain figures to gain power. So the preferences of society's choice ultimately slowly shift to: what kind of figure do they want to gain power.

### **Multi Patronage and Melting-Pot Social Cleavage**

In the context of political parties, secularism manifests itself into several indicators: exclusion of religious scholars (*ulama*) from political arena; displacement of Islamic identity, which is usually palpable in certain religious forms or symbols; actions or policies taken by Islamic parties because of the demands of political pragmatism; and so on (M. Latief, 2017). Every effort to separate Islam and politics were originated from the government to the governed side, the society. The ideas to privatize Islam had always come from and forced by the elite government to 'tame' Muslim societies in Indonesia's political arena (Subedi & Scott, 2021).

The dichotomy of an Islamic parties and secularist parties that both merges and carries a similar pattern between the two types of parties. The party's vote still correlates strongly with its own history-cultural-based support from the society. For example, PDI-P vote is still significantly correlated with historical support for secularist parties (especially with nationalism), on the other hand support from traditionalist Islam voters still correlates strongly with PKB (M. Latief, 2017). When interparty competitiveness increases it could plausibly affected the operation of the party based on the current strategic environment. Consider for example the case of modernist political Islam. While the PAN is typically considered as having the strongest ties to Muhammadiyah, other parties also claim to represent Islamic modernism, and their electoral support is in fluctuation between 1999 to 2019. While some voters who identify themselves as modernist Islam did not vote for PAN or PPP anymore, their vote may have switched to other parties who have the same ideological features. It can be considered that PKB and PPP are competing for NU's traditional Islamic constituency, and PKS, PBB, and PPP for Masyumi's legacy.

The ideological dimension between secularist and Islamist parties is not strongly associated with programmatic differentiation between the two types of political parties. Yet at least for some large segments of the Indonesian electorate, partisan allegiances are not exclusively a matter of patronage politics or about supporting "electable" leaders. Rather, they go back to deep-rooted social and cultural cleavages that are still meaningful today in spite of decades of authoritarian repression and the apparent ideology marginalization in contemporary politics (M. Latief, 2017). Why do moslem voters prefer nationalist parties, especially PDIP rather than Islamic parties especially PKB whose social basic was NU people? All parties belonging to either Islamic parties or non-Islamic parties or secularist parties or they often refer to themselves as "nationalist parties" practicing the social good in society or politics of benevolence (H. Latief, 2013) even though it is done temporally. The party's chairman and party board show the attributes and symbols of Islam so that in the perception of the society both types of parties are no different.

Similar social identity of Islamic parties with secularist parties so that people seek "another value added" without considering the party. This condition combined with overwhelming expectations of Islamic parties that are difficult to achieve. When parties do not have a clear identity which then people perceive there is no difference between Islamic parties or secularist parties because party managers are equally appealing Islamist symbols. These phenomena formed the relationship between political parties and civil society and (Fossati, 2016) and (Ufen, 2009)



political movements wrote, drive to the fading partisan affiliation. Why do muslim voters prefer nationalist parties, especially PDIP rather than Islamic parties especially PKB whose social basic was NU people?

All parties belonging to either Islamic parties or non-Islamic parties or secularist parties or they often refer to themselves as "nationalist parties" practicing the social good in society or politics of benevolence (H. Latief, 2013) even though it is done temporally. The party's chairman and party board show the attributes and symbols of Islam so that in the perception of the society both types of parties are no different. Similar social identity of Islamic parties with secularist parties so that people seek "another value added" without considering the party. This condition combined with overwhelming expectations of Islamic parties that are difficult to achieve. "We actually do not care for the party, brother. They are all the same. I do not think what Islamic parties they are, like PKB, PPP, I don't know exactly whether they are better than others or not. Just the same. So, we do not care that what parties have to do. I used to choose PDI because there is "Bapake" (the patron) there. He often helps people because of their problems, more care for people because when the party people not do so. I do not know what the party is." When parties do not have a clear identity which then people perceive there is no difference between Islamic parties or secularist parties because party managers are equally appealing Islamist symbols. These phenomena formed the relationship between political parties and civil society and (Fossati, 2016) and (Ufen, 2009) political movements wrote, drive to the fading partisan affiliation.

Traditional Muslim voters affiliated with the Islamic organization *Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)* or also called *nahdhiyyin*, have autonomy for vote based on rational, demand-oriented and personal perception in choosing a political party. The NU people (*nahdhiyyin*) do not feel attached to Islamic-based or mass-based parties, because in society's view, all parties are equal, there is no significant differentiation between Islamic parties and non-Islamic parties or secularist parties. They make choices based on perceptions of personal intimacy with person as patron affiliated with certain political party. The presence of strong local actor who have attributes and social identities that meet the criteria of non-party ideological closeness and primordial bonds are more meaningful and can be strong patron. In the research area found a strong local actor who have the attributes and complete identity of the NU identity, good people and like helping small people. This actor is affiliated to the secularist party, the PDIP, and *nahdhiyyin* people feel represented by patronage across the border so as not to feel the need for a patron from the Islamic political party.

## CONCLUSION

The main issues of why secularist political parties defeat Islamic political parties in muslim societies was issued by the relationship between political party and civil society. It indicates temporary relations when the political party does not fully have the ability to maintain its social base permanently and long term. The societies also has autonomy in determining political choices including in choosing political parties in elections that are no longer determined by the identity of the social base. Societies has a new affiliate size that is determined from the personal closeness and the proximity of the social identity that the patron has. Multi patronage found in this research is shown by the presence of multi patron who have social identity representing the general public that the majority are traditional Muslims. Multi patronage has a stepping stone effect to the appearance of divergent clientelism that allows for crossing of social cleavage boundaries. No social boundaries of social cleavage in the societies means no longer glued to political orientation preference linearly but it opens space for multi-direction political preference. Its named melting-pot cleavage, the new phenomenon of new type of social cleavage shapping the relationship between political parties and civil societies.

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